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 Phainomenon and  Logos in Aristotle ’ s Ethics 
 Lawrence J.  Hatab 
 If we want to know how phenomenology can address virtue ethics, surely we 
must begin with Aristotle as the fi rst phenomenologist who thought about 
virtue. 1 How are we to understand him as a phenomenologist? Aristotle seems 
unique in the Western tradition up until the nineteenth century: for Aristotle, 
human beings belong in the natural world and are at home in it. Th ere is no other 
reality than the world we inhabit. Unlike Platonism, medieval philosophy, or 
even modern philosophy, human existence is not subject to some fundamental 
fl aw (respectively: embodiment, the fall, or common sense) that philosophy 
is called upon to repair. For Aristotle, the ordinary world of our experience is 
fully prepared and meant to elicit philosophical understanding. Philosophy, 
therefore, will begin with how the world  already appears to us in various ways, 
 before we philosophize. Philosophy amounts to an explication, clarifi cation, and 
improvement of natural experience, especially through gathering patterns and 
organizing concepts (see  Physics , 184a1621). 
 Aristotle ’ s phenomenology is therefore a philosophy that begins with natural 
and cultural  appearances , an orientation that can be understood in four main 
ways: 
 Investigation 1. should begin with observable  phainomena , through which the 
search for explanations can properly proceed ( Parts of Animals , 640a15ff ). 
Phenomena are the  “ witnesses ” and  “ paradigms ” for philosophical inquiry 
( Eudemian Ethics , 1216b26ff ). Contrary to speculative metaphysics and 
etiological stories, Aristotle insists that the  “ why ” and the  “ what ” of things 
cannot be examined before the  “ that ” ( to hoti ) of things; to reverse this 
order  “ is to inquire into nothing ” ( Posterior Analytics , 93a1528). Aristotle 
takes his point of departure, not from theoretical constructions, but from 
what is immediately apparent in perceptible encounters. Th ese phenomena 
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should be understood essentially as  perceptible wholes , in the way that things 
(like trees) present themselves to us in ordinary experience — an orientation 
that distinguishes Aristotle ’ s thinking from Platonic transcendence and the 
elemental reductions of earlier natural philosophers and atomists. 
 Investigation 2. will be guided by  language . Aristotle oft en begins by 
consulting what  “ is said ” or what  “ we say, ” by taking certain meanings 
or usages as given. 2 He then proceeds to think with and through these 
linguistic inheritances toward clearer and deeper insights. In general terms, 
Aristotle assumes an intrinsic correlation between language and being; the 
elements of being cannot be understood apart from what is said of them 
( Metaphysics , 992b1922). 3 
 Philosophy 3. should consult both  “ the many ” and  “ the wise, ” that is, both 
common beliefs and refi ned insights ( Topics , 100b22ff ). Th e implication 
is that philosophical fi ndings should be neither so unusual as to violate 
familiar senses of things nor so familiar as to rest solely with ordinary 
experience. 
 With 4. respect to  “ the wise, ” Aristotle begins most of his investigations 
with a survey of historical precedents that have marked philosophical 
understanding so far, with the aim of sorting out what in these sources is 
appropriate or inappropriate to phenomena. Contrary to some readings of 
Aristotle that take his surveys to be simply setups meant to valorize his own 
thinking by contrast, Aristotle seems to genuinely believe that philosophy 
should build from beliefs that have already found a place in human thinking 
(see  Metaphysics , 993a30ff ). For Aristotle, it is hard for human thinking to 
be entirely in error. 4 
 Aristotle ’ s philosophy 
 As opposed to the transcendent tendencies in Platonism and the abstract 
deductions typical of earlier philosophers, Aristotle was a thoroughgoing realist 
and naturalist, and his thinking stressed particularity and plurality. Consider 
Aristotle ’ s concept of  ousia , the primary sense of being as the unifi ed reference 
for descriptions.  Ousia , for Aristotle — unlike the Platonic conception of being 
and the connotations of the Latinate  “ substance ” — is primarily a  “ this something ” 
( tode ti ), an imminent, concrete presence in experience ( Categories , 3b1012). 
Species and genera are  ousia in a secondary sense, in that they reveal something 
about being, but not in a primary sense (2b2931). Secondary  ousia (e.g. the 
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universal  “ tree ” ) does not exist in its own right (hence Aristotle ’ s critique of 
Platonic Forms). Th e primary sense of  ousia suggests the radicality of the  “ that ” 
over the  “ what, ” the sense of presence in temporal experience. 
 Aristotle ’ s ontology of nature is essentially about temporal fi nitude, motion, 
and change. In the  Physics , he investigates the explanations and ordering principles 
of nature ( phusis ), which is directly identifi ed with movement and change 
( Physics , 200b12). Th ings of nature have an intrinsic principle of movement, as 
distinct from things brought into being extrinsically by production (192b10ff ). 
 Phusis , then, has to do with self-manifesting beings. Th e task of analysis is to 
make sense out of change and movement, which Aristotle accomplishes by way 
of the concepts of matter and form, which are given a dynamic quality in the 
concepts of potentiality ( dunamis ) and actualization ( energeia ). It is important 
to stress that both  dunamis and  energeia are active concepts, for Aristotle. 
Th e two together represent a single model of process (201a10ff ).  Dunamis as 
potentiality is not simply possibility, but an active  power , a capacity to develop; 
and  energeia as actuality is not simply a fi nished state, but being at work ( ergon ) 
in the actualizing of potential. Form ( eidos ), then, cannot be understood simply 
as a static  “ shape, ” but rather as the active self- organization of a developing being 
(194b27). Notice that  energeia and  dunamis are coordinated with  telos (end) in 
Aristotle ’ s coinage of  entelecheia (literally  “ having-an-end-in ” one ’ s being), so 
that the movements of  phusis involve a being-toward, a self-emerging being on 
the way toward a not-yet that can-be, which is to say, a coming to presence of an 
absence ( Physics , 191b13ff ). In thinking  ousia as a concrete occurrence in natural 
experience, Aristotle is able to give movement, change, time, and negation their 
appropriate senses of being. 
 In Aristotle ’ s text on the soul ( psuch ē , understood as life), we have a 
phenomenology of an active, temporal movement animated by potentiality. Th e 
soul is the form of the body ’ s matter, not as something separate from the body 
but as the gathered actualization of potentials in a living being, an active capacity 
to function and develop ( De Anima , II.1). For Aristotle, the self is essentially an 
activity, not a static entity. Th ere is a unifi ed coalescence of capacity, activation, 
performance, and being in human nature in such a way that we  are a living and 
a doing ( NE , 1167b31 – 1168a10). 
 Unlike the subject-object bifurcation in modern philosophy, Aristotle ’ s 
refl ections on the soul off er a bipolar conception of self and world. Th ough 
sensation and its object are not the same being, they have one and the same 
 energeia ( De Anima , 425b27 – 29, 426a16 – 18). In an analogous way, thought is 
potentially the same as the things it thinks (429a13 – 17). Th inking is nothing 
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until it thinks something in the world and what it thinks must  be in thought 
(429b3 – 431a1). Th e actively thinking soul  is the things it thinks (431b16 – 18). 
In this account of activity, Aristotle alludes (417a15 – 18) to a discussion in the 
 Physics (III.1 – 3) where he claims that in activity the agent and patient are a  single 
process of actualization (illustrated by teaching and learning, building, and a 
house being built). Th e agent is not something self-contained in an interior zone, 
 “ cut off  ” ( apotetm ē men ē ) from the object of its activity (202b2). Th e potential of 
 both is actualized in a single bipolar process. Not only does Aristotle accept the 
existence of the external world without question ( Physics , 193a2 – 3), his realism 
goes so far as to claim that mind and world are a single joint activity, that the 
mind is  meant to know the world and the world is  meant to be known by the 
mind. We have here a single correlation rather than a relation between two 
separate spheres. Th e very being of thought is essentially correlative with what it 
thinks ( Metaphysics , 1021a27ff ). 
 Th e realism of Aristotle is not of a uniform kind. First, there is the plurality 
of being:  “ being is spoken of in many ways ” ( Metaphysics , 1003a34). Whatever 
unity there is in the notion of being will at best be analogical, since being cannot 
provide a universal genus (1042a23). Diff erent forms of being all  “ point ” to 
 ousia , but not in a uniform way (1003a33 – 34). Aristotle also gives a pluralistic 
account of truth in Book VI of the  Nicomachean Ethics . Th ere he stipulates two 
basic modes of the soul ’ s  “ having  logos ” ( logon echon ): (1) that involving beings 
whose origins cannot be otherwise (necessary being), and (2) that involving 
beings whose origins admit of being otherwise (contingent being), which calls 
for  bouleusis , or deliberation and decision (1139aff ). Th e  “ virtue ” of each mode 
is its own proper function or work ( ergon ) in relation to the diff erent spheres of 
being. What follows is a discussion of fi ve  “ intellectual virtues ” : pertaining to 
the fi rst mode of  logos are  epist ē m ē (scientifi c knowledge),  nous (intuitive grasp 
of indemonstrable principles), and  sophia (wisdom); pertaining to the second 
mode are  techn ē (skill in making) and  phron ē sis (practical wisdom or acting well 
in human aff airs). Aristotle then identifi es these fi ve virtues of thought with fi ve 
modes of truth, which are defi ned as the diff erent functions and dispositions of 
the diff erent virtues; indeed, the virtues are fi ve ways in which the soul is  al ē theuei 
or  “ in the truth ” (1139b12 – 18). Aristotle is here connecting truth with the very 
being of the soul. Moreover, it is evident that truth is not limited to statements of 
scientifi c exactitude; it also applies to inexact modes of discerning appropriate 
action in spheres such as ethics. For Aristotle, there is truth in human living 
( praxis ) that is diff erent from conclusive, demonstrative forms of truth. 
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 Aristotle ’ s ethics is prepared in his analysis of the soul. As indicated earlier, 
the human soul is not something separate from the body, but the active capacity 
to lead a natural life. And the capacity ( dunamis ) that moves human life is desire 
( On the Soul , 433b1), understood as a striving toward conditions in the world 
aff ecting the actualization of potential. Desire ( oreksis ) cuts across all three parts 
of the human soul: as appetite in the vegetative part, emotion in the sensitive part, 
and wish in the rational part ( On the Soul , III.10). Desire involves the experience 
of an absence with respect to a desired condition ( orekton ), which opens up 
the structure of striving toward a desired end ( telos ), as well as the need for 
deliberation and choice regarding diff erent ways of actualizing potential ends. 
Deliberation about desire has an essentially temporal structure in considering 
future possibilities in terms of present aims in the light of past experiences 
(433b5 – 10). Th is brings us to the sphere of ethics. 
 Aristotle ’ s ethics 
 For Aristotle, ethics, like any other area of inquiry, must begin with  phainomena 
before relevant questions are sorted out ( NE , 1145b2 – 8). In the following passage, 
notice how a phenomenology of ethics includes the main elements sketched 
earlier in this investigation (the  “ that, ” language, the many, and the wise): 
 One ought not to demand an explanation [ aitian ] in all things alike, either, but 
it is suffi  cient in some cases for it to be shown beautifully  that something is so 
[ to hoti ], in particular such things as concern starting-points [ arch ē ]: the  “ that ” 
comes fi rst and is a starting-point. And of starting-points, some are beheld by way 
of examples [ epagoge ], others by perception, others by becoming experienced 
in some habit, and others in other ways. So one must try to go aft er each of 
them by the means that belong to its nature [ pephukasin ], and be serious about 
distinguishing them rightly, since this has great weight in what follows. For the 
starting-point seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things that 
are inquired aft er become illuminated along with it. And in connection with the 
starting-point, one must examine it not only from its conclusion and supporting 
premises, but also from the things that are said about it [ legomen ō n ]. 
 . . . Some of these things are said by many people and from ancient times, 
others by a few well-reputed men, and it is reasonable that neither of these groups 
would be wholly mistaken, and that they be right in some one point or at least or 
even in most of them (1098b1 – 30). 5 
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 An additional element in Aristotle ’ s phenomenology of moral life is that we must 
 already be ethical to a certain degree before we think about ethics. Here the 
importance of upbringing and the inheritance of ethical shaping are essential 
to ethics (1103b22 – 25). Moreover, the extent to which normative factors are 
already operating in human life is indicated in the fi rst line of the  Nicomachean 
Ethics : 
 Every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim at 
some good, and hence it has been beautifully said that the good is that at which all 
things aim (1094a1 – 3). 
 Th e ubiquity of the good means that Aristotle does not pursue metaethical 
questions such as moral skepticism or the is-ought divide, because human 
life  is value-laden all the way down. 6 So the question is not whether ethics 
can be justifi ed, or whether one should be ethical, but rather  how one 
should be ethical. 7 A good deal of Aristotle ’ s ethics is simply stipulated (e.g., 
the nature of virtue), or taken as given, or accepted from precedents — a 
phenomenology that can surely frustrate the justifi cation agenda marking 
so much of Western philosophy. Th inking about ethics, for Aristotle, begins 
with the recognition that the word  “ good ” indicates a desired end (1094a1 – 5). 
And like being, goodness takes a plurality of forms (1096a24 – 25), and the 
diff erent goods are not ultimately commensurable. 8 Living well amounts to 
an organization of diff erent desires in various practical milieus, in such a way 
as to allow the development of human potential. Th e unifying term for the 
good life, for Aristotle, is  eudaimonia , which is the ultimate end for the sake 
of which all actions are done (1097b1). Th e usual translation of  “ happiness ” 
does not suffi  ciently capture Aristotle ’ s meaning, which is better rendered 
as human fl ourishing — living well ( euz ē n ), acting well ( eu prattein ) — the 
active realization of human potentials and the attainment of various natural 
goods (1098b13 – 22). Aristotle maintains that his focus on  eudaimonia is well 
attested to because it accords with both long-standing opinion and the claims 
of philosophers (1098b15 – 19). 
 Beginning with the phenomenology of desire, ethics is the consideration 
of various orderings and judgments concerning better and worse choices —
 because some desires are necessary (needs) and some are contingent (wants), 
because some desires come in confl ict with each other ( NE , 1154b20 – 29), and 
because experience teaches a distinction between real and apparent goods. 
 Eudaimonia will require the exercise of virtue ( aret ē ), which is better rendered 
as human excellence, or a mode of high-level functioning. Th e moral virtues 
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are those character traits, habits, and dispositions that disclose appropriate 
choices and judgments regarding the ordering of desires, all for the sake of 
living well. 
 Aristotle ’ s phenomenological ethics is deliberately counterposed to Platonic 
tendencies toward a rationalistic, universalistic, perfectionist ethics. 9 Refl ection 
on the good cannot bracket tradition and received opinions, but must begin 
with cultural appearances, which can then be submitted to analysis, clarifi cation, 
and puzzle resolution ( NE , 1095b3, 1145b3 – 7). Th e good must also be a  human 
good, refl ecting the fi nite condition of a desiring being experiencing lacks and 
limits, and so ethics should not be measured by divine perfection (1096b30 – 35, 
1178a5 – 15). Th e good is also particular, not universal (1109b22 – 23), relative, 
not absolute (1106b2), contingent, not necessary (1139b7 – 10), practical, not 
theoretical (1103b28 – 30), temporal, not eternal (1096b4), immanent, not 
transcendent (1196b30 – 35), and inexact, not precise (1094b20 – 25). 
 Th e good has a decidedly performative meaning for Aristotle, since it is 
identifi ed with activity and  ergon , which means function, task, or work ( NE , 
1097b24ff ).  Eudaimonia is called the activity ( energeia ) of the soul in accordance 
with virtue or moral excellence (1098a15 – 17). We should think of virtue here 
in the sense of  “ virtuosity, ” as excellence of performance, as eff ective, successful 
action in social life. In fact, Aristotle connects  aret ē in ethics with the excellence 
of a musician, who develops musical skill only by practicing ( NE , II.1). Here, 
Aristotle clarifi es that virtues do not arise naturally in people; they require 
development through practice. But people do have a natural capacity ( dunamis ) 
to develop virtue, which becomes actualized aft er practicing settles into a 
habitual disposition ( hexis ), which could be called  “ second nature ” (1103a31ff ). 
In line with this, Aristotle identifi es ethics as essentially a  practical endeavor, 
where the goal is not knowledge, but becoming good (1103b26 – 29). In fact, he 
chastises people who think moral philosophy is satisfi ed by mere argument or 
talk, comparing them to patients who simply listen to a physician without  doing 
what is prescribed (1105b12 – 19). 
 Eudaimonia is also analyzed in terms of a specifi c temporal structure of 
activity, as a process of coming into being and thus not as the constancy of a 
 “ possession ” ( NE , 1169b29 – 32).  Eudaimonia is fi nally understood in terms of 
the comprehensiveness of the virtues and the course of a complete life (1098a18 –
 21) — in other words, as the overall temporal structure of a life fulfi lling potential, 
and not simply a focus on particular events or experiences. Th is is why the familiar 
association of  “ happiness ” with  “ good feeling ” is so misleading;  eudaimonia is a 
comprehensive and ongoing  achievement , not a  “ state of mind. ” As Aristotle says 
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in another text, the very end ( telos ) of  eudaimonia is not a certain  “ kind of being ” 
( poiot ē s ), but a  life of activity ( Poetics , 1450a16 – 18). In the end,  Eudaimonia is 
measured by the fulfi llment and achievement of various goods that are naturally 
benefi cial for human beings: goods of the environment, the body, and the soul 
( NE , 1098b13ff ). 
 Virtue 
 Th e virtues are the capacities, dispositions, and habits that enable a person to 
orchestrate all the various possible goods, measured by the successful performance 
of a well-rounded life. In this regard, Aristotle insists on the importance of 
good upbringing prior to mature refl ection on the good life. He seems quite 
pessimistic about the prospects for ethical virtue without the cultivation of good 
habits and dispositions from early on in life ( NE , 1095b4ff , 1103b21 – 25). He 
connects character ( ē thos ) with habit ( ethos ) and says that virtues arise mostly 
through teaching and learning, and they require time and the accumulation of 
experience to develop (1103a14ff ). Th is is why Aristotle points to the limits of 
rational argument in ethics (1179b1ff ). Th ere is just so much you can say to a 
person inclined to vice, and people open up to ethical matters in ways other than 
strict analysis of beliefs and their rational justifi cation (1179a34 – 1180a33). 
 For Aristotle, each virtue involves (1) a certain situation or context of 
action, (2) a certain aff ect, attitude, or capacity for action with respect to that 
situation, (3) vices of excess and defect with respect to the aff ect, attitude, or 
capacity, and (4) the virtue of the appropriate mean between the two vices. 
So virtues are defi ned as the capacity to discover a mean ( mesot ē s ) between 
extreme conditions of excess and defect, of too much and too little ( NE , 
1104a25ff ). For instance, the virtue of moderation in pleasure-seeking is a 
mean between overindulgence and ascetic denial or insensitivity. Acting well 
according to virtue, however, is a performance that does not operate on the 
basis of theoretical formulas or rules to guide action. Virtuous activity is inexact 
and can only be executed by a competent person in the context of a particular 
 kairos , a particular situation at a particular time (1104a5ff ) — indeed, the  telos 
of an action is specifi cally identifi ed with a  kairos (1110a12 – 13). 
 We might better understand Aristotle ’ s sense of virtue by substituting an 
oscillating  balancing act for the notion of a mean, because a mean suggests 
some  “ middle point ” between two poles that distorts the sense of virtuous 
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action displayed in Aristotle ’ s texts. Th e ethical mean, for Aristotle, is not like a 
numerical or spatial mean, which would be uniform for all cases ( NE , 1106a27ff ); 
it is more like a process of tightening and loosening a tension (1138b23). As 
indicated above, virtuous action varies according to the context, the specifi c 
individual, and the particular situation. Sometimes, the mean will be closer to 
one of the extremes than to the other ( Eudemian Ethics , 1222a22ff ); for instance, 
some situations might demand more or less generosity; sometimes, degrees 
of defi ciency or excess can be praiseworthy ( NE , 1109b16ff ), as in the case of 
certain strong passions that might be useful in leadership. A general account 
of the mean is diffi  cult to articulate, since it is relative to particular cases and 
perceptions (1126b3 – 4). 
 Even if we consider specifi c discoveries of the mean by particular individuals, 
what would tell them that they had found some  “ middle point? ” If there is no 
general formula for fi nding the mean, why formalize the matter at all by suggesting 
some measure borrowed from mathematics? Instead, we can call virtue a balancing 
act in the midst of counterforces, in the manner of an oscillating attunement. Th is 
would be consistent with Aristotle ’ s remarks about fi nding the mean by tending 
toward the extremes ( NE , 1109b2ff ). Th e measure of virtuous action would not 
be some generalizable or even particularizable locus of precision, but more a 
mode of discovery that unfolds as an experiment in learning how to live well, 
an experiment that proceeds by experiencing confl icting forces and possibilities, 
and then discovering balances that foster successful living. As Aristotle says, 
individuals have diff erent natural tendencies and aims, and they come to learn 
what works well by tending in confl icting directions and gauging the appropriate 
path (1109b2 – 28). We might say that the Aristotelian  “ doctrine ” of the mean 
does not so much defi ne or locate a proper action, as much as set the negative 
boundaries for what is out of line (the vices), and open space for individual 
discovery somewhere  between these boundaries. 10 Virtue as a balancing act within 
these boundaries is a general guideline that can only be actualized in concrete 
cases and in diff erent ways. Th e specifi city of virtuous action entails that there is 
no external or formulaic support for ethical action, which is thus  “ ungrounded ” in 
the sense of being revealed only in the immediate present. Th e general character 
of virtue ( “ Find the appropriate balance between extremes ” ) does not justify or 
explain virtuous action (what the appropriate balance  is in a certain situation); 
rather, the defi nition of virtue simply points to the task of its discovery. Th is would 
fi t Aristotle ’ s account of his ethics as a rough outline ( tup ō ) of the parameters of 
virtue rather than an exact description of virtuous acts (1103b35ff ). 
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 Th e  logos of virtuous living 
 A central term in Aristotle ’ s ethics is  logos , usually translated as  “ reason. ” But 
it must be stressed that the  “ rationality ” of ethics in Aristotle should not be 
understood in terms of modern models of reason that are based on abstract 
principles and the refl ective posture of the thinking subject detached from action 
in the world. Th e soul ’ s bipolar relation with the world suggests that living well 
is environmentally responsive — that is, the movements of the soul are likewise 
the opening up of the world — as opposed to the modern theoretical model of 
constructing moral principles and applying them to experience as rules for 
action. We noted that a virtue becomes a  hexis , a settled, habitual disposition 
to act and function well ( NE , 1106a12ff ). Th e word  hexis is related to  echein , 
having, and in another text, Aristotle defi nes  hexis as both activity ( energeia ) and 
having, and in both cases, he assigns a bipolar structure  between having and the 
thing had, also between making and the thing made ( Metaphysics , V.20) — which 
recalls the bipolar structure of activity and knowing discussed earlier. In another 
chapter,  hexis is even something that can  “ possess ” the haver, as when a fever 
 “ possesses ” a person (V.23). All this suggests that virtue is not simply an agent-
centered phenomenon, but an environmentally responsive power that  “ blends, ” 
as it were, the agent with its world — where virtuous action and its situation in 
the world are co-disclosed. 
 Th e structure of desire indicates complex intersections of self and world that 
call for appropriate ordering in practice, rather than some kind of theoretical 
governance. Th is is why ethical thinking, for Aristotle, has neither the precision 
nor the operative procedures of modern conceptions of reason. Th e Greek word 
 logos has a rich array of meanings, and there are occasions where Aristotle 
clearly takes  logos to mean a kind of proportional ordering and attunement ( NE , 
1119b16). 11 Let us explore this idea in more detail. 
 Th e practical virtue of  phron ē sis (sometimes translated as  “ practical wisdom ” ) 
is central to Aristotle ’ s ethics. Since  phron ē sis does not exhibit demonstrative 
certainty, it is better to see its  “ rationality ” as an emergent ordering and 
balancing of desires in the midst of contingent practical environments. Aristotle 
characterizes  phron ē sis as the ability to discover the mean ( NE , 1107a1 – 2). 
Rather than some kind of rationalized subjective agency,  phron ē sis is  “ being in 
the truth ” (1140b5), in the sense of disclosing an appropriate path in pursuit 
of an aim in the midst of confl icting forces.  Phron ē sis and the mean are also 
identifi ed with  orthos logos (1103b32 – 34, 1138b20 – 25, 1144b25 – 30), which is 
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oft en translated as  “ correct reason. ” But  orthos logos is connected with aiming 
at a target and with a tightening and relaxing that suggests either a bow string 
or tuning a lyre string (1138b21 – 25); at another point (1109b24 – 27), Aristotle 
says that fi nding the mean is facilitated by tending toward the excess and defect, 
again suggesting a  “ tuning. ” 
 I want to argue that Aristotle ’ s usage of  orthos  logos does not readily fi t what 
we would expect  “ correct reason ” to mean, that is, an explanation or justifi cation 
that can satisfy intersubjective criteria for a logical argument. Aristotle ’ s 
phenomenology of virtue seems to off er something diff erent from modern 
conceptions of rationality. At one point ( NE , II.2)  orthos  logos is correlated with 
action ( praxis ) as opposed to knowledge — and right here Aristotle talks about 
the  “ inexact ” nature of this inquiry, that only virtuous agents themselves can 
discover in each specifi c case ( kairos ) what is  orthos . It is not clear how such 
specifi city could satisfy familiar criteria for rational adjudication. We have noted 
that Aristotle sometimes employs  logos as a kind of proportional ordering. 
He also connects  logos with the essential being ( ousia ), function ( ergon ), and 
active capacity ( dunamis ) of a living being as a whole ( On the Soul , 412b10 –
 413a10); indeed,  “ actuality ( entelecheia ) is the  logos of potential being ” (415b15). 
Th ese usages all suggest something substantive rather than discursive. In the 
same text (425b26ff ), when discussing sensation and its object having one 
and the same actualization, he describes proper sensation as the  logos between 
extreme conditions that destroy the sense (426a27ff ), for instance, an excess of 
brightness or darkness with respect to vision. Here  logos has nothing to do with 
 “ reasoning, ” but rather the  nature and bipolar structure of disclosure. Likewise, 
the ethical mean could be called the virtuous disclosure of proper action (and 
like the sensation case, it can involve the bipolar actualization of virtuous action 
together with its situation in the world). 
 Th e point is that  logos here would not mean a  “ rational account ” but the very 
character and nature of an immediate virtuous act. Aristotle does use the word 
 logos at times pertaining to an articulate account and reasoning, but at other 
times,  logos pertains to the very form or essence of something. 12 Accordingly, 
 orthos logos need not be understood as a rational account or guide for action, 
but as the very form of an  achievement . 13 If we consider the examples of archery 
or music that Aristotle uses to illustrate  orthos logos , we can see the futility of 
certain  “ rational ” questions in this context: How did you (know how to) hit the 
bull ’ s-eye? How did you know that the instrument was tuned properly? Th e best 
one can say is:  “ I just did. ” Virtuous action, for Aristotle, seems to be a similar 
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case. As we will see, this is not to exclude  logos -as-articulation from ethics. But 
it seems that  orthos logos can be more like skillful action and direct engagement 
than an explanation or rational account. 14 
 Relevant to this discussion are the several times Aristotle calls virtuous 
discernment a mode of perception ( aisth ē sis ). 15 Indeed, in one passage ( NE , 
1143a35ff ), Aristotle identifi es this kind of ethical perception with  nous , in the 
sense of an immediate insight not derived from reasoning ( logos ). Moreover, the 
phenomenological character of this kind of insight is shown in the following 
passages: 
 Th e person of serious moral stature discerns each thing correctly [ orthos ], and in 
each kind the truth shows itself to this person [ tal ē thes aut ō phainetai ] . . . [who] 
is distinguished most of all perhaps for seeing [ horan ] what is true in each kind, 
since such a person is as it were a rule and measure for what is noble and pleasant. 
(1113a30 – 35) 
 What appears [ to phainomenon ] to the person of serious moral stature truly is 
the thing . . . . And what appear to be pleasures to this person truly are pleasures. 
(1176a17ff ) 
 It seems that a virtuous person directly  “ perceives ” the right path, which is 
diff erent from a reasoned inference.  Phron ē sis is specifi cally identifi ed with 
perception because unlike scientifi c knowledge ( epist ē m ē ),  phron ē sis apprehends 
 “ ultimate particulars ” in direct experience (1142a24ff ), ultimate ( eschaton ) in that 
like intuitive insight in  nous , such perception requires no further justifi cation. In 
general terms, virtuous perception attends to the specifi c features of a concrete 
situation that fi gure in ethical discernment (as opposed to generalizations). 
 With respect to  orthos logos , we should also consider the range of meanings 
in the word  orthos . 16 It can indeed mean  “ correct, ” but also straight, upright, safe, 
happy, and prosperous. Th e word also associates with seeing straight, hearing 
attentively, restoring to health and happiness, guiding rightly, honoring, and 
exalting. Th e word is derived from  ortho ō , meaning to set up straight or stand 
up from a reclined or fallen posture.  Orthos can also mean real, genuine, or 
steadfast. If we think of steadfast as a capacity to stand against falling back, we 
can think of  orthos marking a steady capacity for proper action. We can see here 
the many shades of  orthos connecting with Aristotle ’ s sense of virtuous action, 
in ways that are diff erent from the meaning of  “ correct. ” And  orthos , as  “ straight ” 
versus  “ crooked, ” can have the sense of  “ direct ” versus  “ roundabout ” or  “ missed, ” 
which certainly captures Aristotle ’ s metaphor of hitting a target — which is a 
direct achievement rather than a cognitive claim. 
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 Orthos can also connote succeeding at an aim, especially in the word 
 katorth ō sis , variants of which Aristotle uses several times pertaining to virtuous 
action ( NE , 1106b26 and 31, 1107a15, 1142b30). Consequently,  orthos logos 
can refer to successful action in a practical environment, accomplished by an 
attunement of the soul with its environment, something very diff erent from 
 “ correct reason. ”  Phron ē sis , then, is much more suggestive of an active self-world 
attunement than something like rational agency.  Phron ē sis could be called a 
capacity for practical discernment, or an ethical fi nesse, a cultivated aptitude 
to uncover the appropriate balancing and ordering of practical possibilities. 
Aristotle specifi cally says that  phron ē sis is not mere knowledge — it must include 
action (1152a8 – 9). Moreover, as a developed disposition and  “ having ” ( hexis ), it 
is registered in a person ’ s very being, and so it cannot be  “ forgotten, ” as can factual 
knowledge (1140b28 – 30). And with respect to  phron ē sis as a  hexis , we should 
note that Aristotle describes it as a disposition to act not simply  “ according to 
( kata )  orthos logos ” — which carries a more inferential meaning — but  “ in the 
midst of/along with ( meta )  orthos logos ” (1144b26ff ) — which suggests a more 
constitutive meaning. 
 Measuring virtue 
 Discovering the mean is relative to a particular person ’ s situation ( NE , 1106b1), 
which makes virtuous action diffi  cult, because it is context-dependent. Formal 
compliance with a rule is easy; judging the proper balance and appropriate action 
in a certain situation, in a certain way, at a certain time, to a certain degree, for 
a certain purpose, is hard (1109a24ff ). For example, generosity could vary in its 
suitability or vary in degrees according to the circumstances, persons, resources, 
prospects, and so on. What is appropriate can only be rendered at the time and 
in the situation of a particular agent, and it demands an  experience of particulars, 
which is neither exact nor universal (1109b22ff ). Consequently, Aristotle ’ s ethics 
does not involve moral axioms or formulas that can transcend and govern the 
specifi city of experience. To be sure, ethics can involve certain generalizations 
presented in an unqualifi ed ( hapl ō s ) form (e.g.,  “ It is good to be generous ” ), 
but ethical practice will always have to confront qualifi cations in experience 
(1134a25ff ). 17 
 Aristotle appears to be advocating a kind of decisionism or intuitionism 
in ethics, because the measure of virtuous action is the virtuous person ( NE , 
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1113a25ff ); the measure of the good is that which appears to the good person 
(1176a17ff ). An ethical decision cannot be arbitrary, however, since it must 
be responsive to the environment at hand and shaped by past experience. But 
 as contextual, a decision is saturated with contingency (1112b8ff ) — which is 
exactly why ethical actions involve  choice rather than necessary outcomes. To 
be educated in ethics is not to have decisive knowledge; indeed, the mark of an 
educated person is seeking only the degree of precision that the nature of an 
endeavor will allow (1094b23 – 25). As we have noted, the discipline of ethics 
cannot issue exact rules and measures; it can only be sketched in broad outline 
with an eye toward enactment by virtuous persons in concrete circumstances. 
Truth in ethics can only be judged by way of  performances in life ( ta erga kai 
ton bion ); otherwise, it is mere words (1179a18 – 23). Aristotle is certainly not 
an ethical relativist or subjectivist. Th e proper action is  “ objective ” in the sense 
of being duly responsive to the environment at hand, such that anyone in this 
situation would do the same thing. So there  is a kind of  “ correctness ” in virtuous 
action, but its immediacy does not issue an  “ objective standard ” that anyone 
 outside this situation would likewise grasp. 
 In Aristotle, a virtue becomes a mode of the soul ’ s being, a  hexis , or 
 “ having ” ( NE , 1106a13), a capacity to make appropriate choices that with 
practice becomes habit, or second nature (see 1152a31 – 34). An ethical habit, for 
Aristotle, is not some mechanical operation or instinctive drive, but an acquired 
capacity to act well that eventually can become relatively unforced and natural. 
As a settled way of  being , we could call habit a mode of in-habiting an ethical 
environment. Aristotle seems to be saying that a truly virtuous person will act 
well without much analysis or diffi  culty. 
 It is important to note that genuine virtue, for Aristotle, is  rare ( NE , 1109a29). 
A summary of Aristotle ’ s conception of true virtue can be gleaned from his 
discussion of  akrasia , or weakness of will ( NE , VII.1 – 10). Aristotle distinguishes 
persons as being virtuous, morally strong, morally weak, and vicious. A virtuous 
person does the good habitually, even with pleasure (1099a6ff ). A morally 
strong person knows what is good but struggles to do it. A morally weak person 
knows what is good but fails to do it. A vicious person acts badly without regret. 
We would tend to call the morally strong person virtuous in many respects, but 
Aristotle would not. Aristotle ’ s ideal, though diffi  cult to achieve, seems to be 
a person who moves through life with ethical composure and facility, whose 
desires have become properly attuned, and who possesses all the virtues as a 
unifi ed whole (1145a1 – 2). Aristotle claims that most people fall in between 
the morally weak and morally strong (1150a9 – 16, 1152a25 – 27). Morally weak 
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people merely speak the right words ( logous ), like actors reciting their lines. A 
truly virtuous person is  “ co-natural ” ( sumphu ē nai ) with the proper path, where 
belief, desire, and proper action are coordinated together (1139b4 – 5, 1147a18ff ). 
Here  phron ē sis , good character, and acting well are all fused in a single package 
(1144a, 1144b30 – 32). 
 Logos , deliberation, and action 
 Now I must confront the question of how my account can accord with elements 
of Aristotle ’ s ethics that seem to refl ect reasoning procedures and logical 
inferences: the so-called practical syllogism and the role of deliberation in 
virtuous living. 
 Th e practical syllogism seems to explain virtuous action as a result of logical 
inferences, with premise-conclusion structures patterned aft er theoretical 
syllogisms. When Aristotle gives examples of practical syllogisms, they 
usually pertain to action scenarios that are not exactly ethical in nature (e.g., 
navigation), but I will focus on one segment of the  Nicomachean Ethics that 
is pertinent to ethics and illustrative of the complex questions at hand:  NE , 
1147a24ff , which is part of the analysis of  akrasia . Th is segment immediately 
follows the claim about the  “ co-natural ” character of the truly virtuous person 
cited above. Aristotle then moves to investigate  akrasia  “ in terms of nature ” 
( phusik ō s ), that is, not according to logical argument but in terms of human 
nature. Th is is where an example of a practical syllogism about eating sweet 
things is introduced: If one ought to taste sweet things, and this thing here is 
sweet, then one must immediately taste it. 18 It would seem that the conclusion 
would more likely be  “ then one ought to taste this, ” which would be followed 
by the action. But it looks like the conclusion  is the action, which is confi rmed 
in another text,  On the Movement of Animals , 7: the conclusion of a practical 
syllogism  “ becomes the action ” ( ginetai h ē praxis ), something done  euthus , 
immediately (701a13 – 15), as in the case of  “ Every man ought to walk; one 
is a man; immediately one walks. ” Returning to the tasting syllogism ( NE , 
1147a25 – 31), the major premise is a general belief about a good, the minor 
premise involves a  perception of a particular, and then, just as in a theoretical 
syllogism, where the soul must affi  rm the conclusion, here the soul is compelled 
( anank ē ) to  do the conclusion immediately ( prattein euthus ). Again, there is 
something logically peculiar about the practical syllogism; the conclusion 
seems to be not  “ cognition, ” but an action. 
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 In any case, Aristotle then depicts the logical structure of  akrasia ( NE , 
1147a32ff ), where the major premise concerns not consuming sweets (as in 
a diet, perhaps), and the conclusion is not to taste the sweet thing — but with 
 akrasia , desire overrides the conclusion. Aristotle says that from the standpoint 
of physiology ( phusiolog ō n ), the akratic person is like someone drunk or asleep, 
whose desire runs contrary to  orthos logos , and who thereby is precluded from 
 “ proper knowledge. ” In context, it seems that the akratic person is constitutionally 
contrasted with the  “ co-natural ” condition of the truly virtuous person noted in 
this segment of the text. I want to suggest that here the practical syllogism is 
more like a logical  reconstruction of an ethical scenario, rather than a  “ causal ” 
account of ethical action, and I say this for two reasons: (1) the conclusion 
seems to  be the action rather than the cause of the action; and (2) the  “ natural ” 
factors in the analysis seem to stress the very  being of the agents rather than 
their reasoning. 
 Th e reconstructive character of the practical syllogism can be gleaned 
from the  Movement of Animals passage cited above. Here the premises involve 
a posited good and a current capacity ( dunatou ) to act on it (701a25). Th en, 
Aristotle says that with obvious premises ( “ one is a man ” ),  “ thinking ( dianoia ) 
does not stop and consider ” them (701a26 – 27). But then, Aristotle speaks 
even more generally about immediate actions done without analysis upon the 
apprehension of some good: 
 What we do without refl ection we do quickly. For with the activation [ energ ē s ē ] of 
a perception or an imagination or a thinking of the for-the-sake-of-which, what is 
desired is done immediately. For the  energeia of desire is a substitute for inquiry 
or thinking. (701a27 – 33) 
 Th e point is that ethical action need not stem from rational inferences — indeed 
it can be a  “ substitute ” for reasoning — and so the practical syllogism can be read 
as a reconstruction of an action rather than a determination of it (who ever 
moves to walk by  inferential steps?). Th is would accord with a passage from the 
 Nicomachean Ethics that distinguishes between an action following examination 
and an immediate action in sudden situations that stems not from examination 
but a settled  hexis (1117a18ff ). Generally, I want to say that at least with regard to 
a fully virtuous person in unexceptional circumstances, a  logos of ethical action 
need not mean rational justifi cation, but rather an articulation that helps us 
 make  sense of an action that is not schematized in advance. 19 
 Next, we should consider the role of deliberation ( bouleusis ) in Aristotle ’ s 
ethics ( NE , III.3). Deliberation leads to  proairesis , which can be called decision 
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or resolve (1113a9ff ). 20 Th e question is whether deliberation fi ts typical models 
of rational analysis that justify or explain ethical decisions. I want to argue that 
ethics, for Aristotle, certainly includes examination and articulation, and that 
decisions can indeed follow upon such discursive practices — but that such 
practices are not a necessary condition for ethical action (especially with full 
virtue) and that even when such practices are in play, they will not likely satisfy 
familiar expectations for rational justifi cation. 
 Deliberation, for Aristotle, is not about a good end ( telos ), but about the means 
toward that end ( NE , 1112b13ff , 1113b3ff ) — so a physician does not deliberate 
about  whether to heal a patient, but  how to heal a particular patient. Th e ethical 
 telos seems  already in place by way of  boul ē sis , a wish or aim (1116b27 – 28). In 
deliberation, one  “ assumes ” the end (1112b16). Th e nondeliberative is associated 
with the  “ immediacy ” of the good person ’ ingrained comprehension of what is 
worthy in life, which pertains not to ratiocination, but a person ’ s very being, as 
indicated in the following account of a practical syllogism (1144a31 – 37), where 
the  telos is the major premise: 
 For deductive reasoning about things done [ sullogismoi t ō n prakt ō n ] has as a 
starting-point ( arch ē n , i.e., the major premise):  “ Since such-and-such is an end 
[ telos ] and the best [ ariston ], ” . . . and this does not show itself [ phainetai ] except 
to a good person; for vice warps a person and produces error about the sources 
[ archas ] that govern action. So it is clear [ phaneron ] that it is impossible [ adunaton ] 
to have practical judgment [ phronimon ] without being good. 
 Moreover, there is no deliberation about direct perceptions ( NE , 1113a1 – 2), 
which presumably play a basic role in ethical action. Deliberation concerns 
contingencies pertaining to actions that aim toward an  assumed good 
(1141b10ff ), especially when the right means is uncertain or indeterminate 
(1112b8ff ). Upon deliberation, ethical decision or resolve is a function of desire, 
or desire fused with thought (1113a10, 1139b4 – 5); thus resolve is diff erent from 
mere cogitation, and even from true belief (1112a5). Resolve is identifi ed with 
virtue, which is called  hexis proairetik ē , a settled disposition of resolve toward 
the mean (1106b36). Ethical decisions are measured as good or bad, not true or 
false as in the case of belief; and decisions mark who we  are as constitutive of our 
character, which is not the case with mere cognition (1111b31ff ). 
 Deliberation is associated in certain ways with  orthos logos . In  NE , VI.9, 
deliberating well ( euboulia ) is  “ a kind of  ”  orthot ē s , but not the kind in  epist ē m ē 
or true belief. Yet deliberation is a  logos , a thinking things through ( dianoias ), 
which is not an assertion but an investigating ( z ē tei ) and reckoning ( logizetai ). Th e 
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 orthot ē s in deliberation concerns what is advantageous or fi tting ( sumpheron ) for 
a particular  telos ; and  phron ē sis is the  “ true comprehension ” ( al ē th ē s hupol ē psis ) 
of what is advantageous or fi tting. Th at  orthot ē s here might involve what I 
earlier called a  “ successful completion of an aim ” can be gleaned from another 
discussion, where Aristotle examines the main objects of pursuit ( aireseis ): the 
noble, the advantageous, and the pleasant (1104b30ff ). Th e good person  “ goes 
right ” with these pursuits, while the bad person  “ goes wrong. ” Th e two terms here 
are  katorth ō tikos and  hamart ē tikos , with the former having a meaning of setting 
straight or successful accomplishment, and the latter a meaning of missing the 
mark or failure. Th e point is that deliberation and resolve are not of an entirely 
diff erent order from features of  orthos logos discussed earlier in this essay — that 
is to say, something more achievement-based then discursive. 21 
 Nevertheless, it is important not to exclude discursive practices, articulation, 
and reasoning from Aristotle ’ s ethics. But even so, such elements cannot fully 
determine — and cannot be separated from — the more nonrational features of 
virtuous discernment we have examined. 22 Surely, examination and deliberation 
are part of ethical life, although I would surmise that they more likely function 
in the spheres of morally weak and morally strong persons, since genuine virtue 
seems to be  “ second nature ” to the truly good person. In any case, one can 
articulate ethical actions in various ways and even supply a set of reasons. Yet, 
the sheer specifi city of virtuous discernment suggests limitations on rational 
discourse: 
 Why did you give him the money? 
 Because it was the generous thing to do. 
 How did you know it was the generous thing to do? 
 Because it was a mean between stinginess and extravagance. 
 How did you know it was a mean? 
 Because he needs the money and will not squander it. 
 How do you know that? 
 Because I know him. 
 How do you know him? . . . 
 It seems that the articulation of virtuous action zeroes in on an immediate and 
unique discernment, in the face of which articulation runs out. So virtuous 
action can involve reasoning, but it need not proceed  from reasoning, and even 
with reasoning, there is a limit to what can be  communicated for explanatory 
purposes. Th e word  logos can apply to the full range of elements here because 
it can refer both to articulation and to the substantive form of a virtuous act. 
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Within Aristotle ’ s ethical naturalism, there is a sense in which human actions are 
value- laden ; such meanings  can be articulated but they need not be. Reasoned 
articulation can prepare and make possible the co-natural inhabitation of 
full virtue that can develop over time — and then function  without reasoned 
articulation. Th e double-sense of  logos thus helps us ascertain the complicated 
interplay of articulation and direct action in Aristotle ’ s ethics. One could say that 
the intellectual virtue of  phron ē sis , the metavirtue of ethical virtues, is itself a 
balancing act between extremes, between sheer cognition and sheer perception, 
between sheer refl ection and sheer action. Such is Aristotle ’ s rich account of how 
ethical discernment shows itself in human life. 
 Notes 
  1  Portions of this essay are drawn from my book,  Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian 
Contributions to Moral Philosophy (Hatab 2000). Extended passages from 
Aristotle ’ s  Nicomachean Ethics (hereaft er  NE ) are taken from the following 
translation (occasionally modifi ed): Aristotle. 2002.  Nicomachean Ethics , trans. Joe 
Sachs. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing. 
  2  For example,  NE 1094a3, 1095a16. See also  Categories 2b31,  Physics 191b2ff , 
 Metaphysics 1003a34ff . 
  3  Consider how the basic concept of being is deployed as  both the bearer of 
properties and the subject of predication ( Categories 1 – 5). For a focused treatment 
of the scholarship on the language-being correlation, see Long 2011, 49 – 56. 
  4  See Long 2011, 56 – 71. 
  5  Th e word  arch ē in this passage is oft en translated as  “ principle ” or  “ fi rst principle. ” 
But that suggests a  governing conception that does not always fi t Aristotle ’ s 
phenomenology.  Arch ē also means  “ beginning ” or  “ origin. ” I think  “ starting-point ” 
fi ts the context of Aristotle ’ s ethics because he is clearly not using  arch ē as some 
kind of rational principle, but rather as the ways in which we already have senses of 
the ethical:  “ For the  arch ē is  that something is so ( to hoti ), and if this is suffi  ciently 
apparent ( phainoito ), there is no additional need for the reason why ” (1095b7 – 8). 
  6  Indeed, the very nature of language, for Aristotle, seems to be originally the 
making manifest ( d ē loun ) of normative concerns ( Politics 1253a10ff ). 
  7  See Burnyeat 1980, 69 – 92. 
  8  NE 1164b2 – 6, 1096a30ff ;  Eudemian Ethics 1243b22;  Politics 1283a3 – 10. 
  9  For a rich and extensive study of the diff erences between Aristotle and Plato on 
the good life, see Martha Nussbaum (1986). 
  10  One of the meanings of  mesos is  “ between, ” and on occasion, Aristotle will use a 
more specifi c meaning of  “ between ” ( metaxu ) in relation to virtue (e.g., 1138b23). 
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  11  For details on the complex and varied meanings of  logos in ancient Greek, see 
Guthrie 1962, 420 – 4. 
  12  See, for example, the former usage in  Metaphysics 1029b20 – 22, and the latter 
usage in 1035b26 – 31. 
  13  See Glidden (1992). Glidden says that Aristotle ’ s call for  orthos logos is like a 
baseball manager telling a pitcher to  “ throw strikes, ” which is an ideal that cannot 
be a  “ rule ” independent of achievement. 
  14  At one point, Aristotle indicates that the  orthos logos of virtue is a mean between 
extremes marked by a certain  horos (1138b18 – 34). Th e word  horos is usually 
translated as  “ standard ” or  “ criterion, ” but it also means  “ limit ” or  “ boundary ” 
(sometimes  between two places). If  horos is a  “ standard, ” we run into the problem 
of Aristotle not seeming to provide one. On this, see Peterson (1988). But it may be 
that there  is no communicable  “ standard, ” only the shaping of a  “ limit, ” of a  “ place ” 
between extremes in a particular case that only a virtuous person can gauge. 
  15  See  NE 1109b18 – 24, 1113a1, 1126b2 – 4, and 1147a26. 
  16  Aristotle himself says that  orthot ē s has more than one meaning (1142b18). 
  17  Th e word  hapl ō s also carries the meaning of  “ simple, ” which is connected 
with  arch ē in  Metaphysics 1059b35. As noted earlier,  arch ē can be translated as 
 “ starting-point, ” which fi ts a good deal of Aristotle ’ s ethics. Once we have been 
schooled in the meaning and importance of the virtues, our minds can have in 
place simple, unqualifi ed guidelines — such as  “ Be generous ” — that  “ start ” our 
ethical sense; but these up-front conceptions are not governing  “ principles ” that 
determine when, whether, or how to be generous. 
  18  For a thorough examination of this text, see Bogen and Moravcsik (1982). 
  19  See McDowell (1999), especially 134 – 7 and note 22. With the Greek word  logos , its 
most basic meaning can be called an articulation that makes sense to an audience. 
See Ferrari (1997). 
  20  See Heidegger 2009, 97. 
  21  For an analysis of nondiscursive elements in Aristotle ’ s approach to ethical 
practice, see Wiggins (1981). 
  22  It is crucial not to construe  “ nonrational ” elements in Aristotle as  “ noncognitive. ” 
Aristotle does not separate cognition from perception or even from emotion. 
Perception and emotion are not  “ thoughtless, ” because they can in their way deliver 
knowledge. For an insightful analysis of the nonrational features of virtue that are 
yet not outside cognition, see Moss (2011). Moss takes on  “ intellectualist ” readings 
of Aristotle that surmise a rational determination of moral ends in  phron ē sis , in 
order to hold off  a purported Hume-style demotion of reason in ethics. She ably 
shows how Aristotle ’ s texts do not support such readings.  Phron ē sis , she argues, 
is the discernment of how to fulfi ll virtuous aims that are already inculcated in 
the soul through habituation (emphasizing the key text of  NE 1144a6 – 9). For an 
account of how emotions fi gure in ethical discernment, see Kosman (1980). 
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